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Studies of collective human behavior in
the social sciences, often grounded in de-
tails of actions by individuals, have much
to offer ‘social’ models from the physi-
cal sciences concerning elegant statistical
regularities. Drawing on behavioral stud-
ies of social influence, we present a par-
simonious, stochastic model, which gener-
ates an entire family of real-world right-
skew socio-economic distributions, includ-
ing exponential, winner-take-all, power
law tails of varying exponents and power
laws across the whole data. The widely
used Albert-Baraba´si model of preferen-
tial attachment is simply a special case
of this much more general model. In ad-
dition, the model produces the continu-
ous turnover observed empirically within
those distributions. Previous preferential
attachment models have generated spe-
cific distributions with turnover using ar-
bitrary add-on rules, but turnover is an
inherent feature of our model. The model
also replicates an intriguing new relation-
ship, observed across a range of empirical
studies, between the power law exponent
and the proportion of data represented.
Since Pareto, the right-skew nature of income
distribution has been known, while similar skew-
ness in the frequencies of words, scientific papers,
and city sizes have been recognised for decades
[1, 2, 3, 4, 5]. In the statistical sciences, par-
ticularly statistical physics, a recent explosion of
interest in such distributions for social phenom-
ena includes internet links [6, 7], author citations
[8], sexual partners [9], and firm sizes and their
extinctions [10, 11] amongst many others.
With socio-economic phenomena, the detailed
debate over the exact form of these distributions
– for example, power laws versus similar fat-
tailed functions such as the stretched exponential
[1, 2, 13] – often involves the characterisation of
the distribution at a point in time, and often ne-
glects the importance of dynamics and the un-
derlying behaviour [12, 14] which gives rise to
changes over time within any given distribution.
Simon [3] argued that right-skew distributions
were so widespread that their key similarity was
likely to be ‘in the underlying probability mech-
anisms’ that led to their generation. This is
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clearly the case but, as noted in the social sci-
ences for over a century [12], it is inherently a
description of macro phenomena, without an ex-
planation for the individual behaviour that gives
rise to emergent properties. Also, with socio-
economic phenomena, the discussion over the ex-
act form of these distributions – true power laws
versus similar fat-tailed functions [1, 2, 13] –
often neglects the importance of dynamics and
their underlying behaviour [12, 14].
We thus propose a model based upon individ-
ual agents who are boundedly rational and are
influenced by the behaviour of other agents in
terms of their decision-making. In other words,
the agents act with social purpose, which is fun-
damentally different from physical or biological
phenomena where the agents (or particles) are
incapable of intent. The model provides four ad-
vances on previous models:
(a) It can generate a wide range of the right-
skew distributions observed in cultural, economic
and social situations from different combinations
of its two parameters.
(b) The widely used Albert-Baraba´si (B-A)
model [7] of preferential attachment is simply a
special case of this much more general model.
(c) In terms of power law fits, there are two es-
sential statistics, the exponent α and the fraction
f of the total observations over which the power
law is believed to hold. The model can replicate
both observed exponents α and the fraction f
from real-world observations [1, 2].
(d) Many real-world right-skew distributions
exhibit constant turnover in the rankings of their
constituents even if their functional form is time-
invariant [14, 15]. Unlike the B-A model [7],
our model is capable of generating such turnover
without recourse to self-fulfilling rules such as
‘aging’ or variable ‘fitness’ of the individual ele-
ments [16].
1 The social influence model
Consider a model populated initially byN agents
located in some space such as the sequence of real
numbers. Depending on the phenomenon, each
location is an abstract representation; it could
refer to the city where a firm chooses to locate
itself, but it could equally well refer to the prod-
uct a consumer chooses, or the idea or fashion
that a person follows.
The model proceeds in a series of steps. In
each step, n new agents enter the model, where
the number n is between 1 and N and fixed as a
parameter in each solution of the model. With
probability 1 − µ, an agent copies the choice of
location from that of an existing agent within the
previous m time steps, or else with probability
µ, the agent innovates by choosing a unique new
location at random. In other words, the agent
either copies an existing agent from the last m
steps, or chooses a new location.
Here we restrict our exploration to two key
parameters of the model, m and µ, by choosing
convenient values for N and n. The ‘memory’
parameter m determines the number of steps of
the previous decisions of other agents over which
an agent looks when making its decision. The
‘innovation’ parameter µ determines the fraction
of the agents who decide to take a completely
new decision rather than replicating one of the
decisions made by other agents.
2 Variety of distributions
A specific version of the model, with m = 1
(i.e., memory only of the immediately preced-
ing step), is known in population genetics and
physics [17, 18]. For the special case of n = N
and m = 1, analytical solutions demonstrate a
power-law distribution [17] for Nµ equal to or
slightly greater than 1. For m = 1 and Nµ 1,
this gradually converges on a winner-take-all dis-
tribution as Nµ approaches zero.
The case where m = all is a further special
category of the model, where extinction or ob-
solescence does not occur. In this case, we can
achieve different power law slopes by varying n
and µ. Figure 1 shows, for example, that we can
match the B-A preferential attachment model
[7], obtaining a power law exponent α ∼ 3 over
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Figure 1: The power law generated from the pref-
erential attachment version of the model. As the
probability distribution for a typical model run
using N = 1, n = 10, t = 20, 000, µ = 0.6, and
m = all (where the generated sizes are logarith-
mically binned). The exponent for the power
law is 2.9 (r2 = 0.996), matching that reported
(also by least-squares regression) for preferential
attachment models [7].
the entire distribution, by using m = all with
N = 1, n = 10, t = 20, 000, and µ = 0.6.
For socio-cultural phenomena, however, we ex-
pect memory to be limited, and thusm in general
to take values below the special case of ‘all’. So
while we define the model to allow m to take any
value between 1 and all, we explore here a lim-
ited range, from m = 1 to m = 100 time steps of
limited memory. The combined effect of varying
m along with varying the innovation parameter
µ generates both a wide range of right-skew dis-
tributional forms and turnover of rankings of lo-
cations within those distributions. Considerable
anthropological and socio-economic evidence ex-
ists [19, 20, 21, 22, 23] on the plausible values for
µ being no greater than 0.1.
Figure 2a plots typical solutions of the model
using acceptable values of µ, while varying m
(holding N = 1000, n = 100 and showing the re-
sults at time step 1000). Aside from the selected
results shown in this figure, the model produces
additional results ranging from a winner-take-all
outcome, to a power law over the entire distri-
bution (exponent α ∼ 1.5), to a power law fitted
to the tail of varying exponent. Figure 2b illus-
trates how the model parameters can be selected
so that the results match real-world right-skew
distributions, such as religions, website subscrip-
tions, word use, names, and author citations.
3 Regularity in the long tail
Table 1 lists power law tail exponents α for vari-
ous recently collated social data sets [1, 2] along
with the fraction f(= ntail/n) of total obser-
vations in the tail. A striking, and previously
unreported, feature of these estimates is the re-
lationship between α and f , where these data
reveal a clear inverse correlation. The smaller
the fraction f of the distribution best-fit to a
power law tail [24], the larger the exponent α of
that tail. The least-squares fit is α ∼= 1.54f−0.156
(r2 = 0.952).
Figure 3 plots this relationship in the empirical
data along with the least squares fit using the
model, as solved 100 times, for each of µ = 0.05,
0.06 and 0.07, with m = 30 in each case (and
N = 1000, n = 100, t = 1, 000). The results
show α ∼= 1.56f−0.155 (r2 = 0.975), very similar
to the data-based relationship.
4 Distribution of turnover
The model also produces continual turnover
through time for any given distribution as
demonstrated by the distributions of lifespans
within ranked lists as in Figure 4a. This resem-
bles the lifespans of real world social and eco-
nomic fat-tail distributions in Figure 4b. The
memory parameter m again expands the power
of the model. Although turnover has already
been demonstrated [17] for the special case m =
1, different values of m are needed to account
for empirically observed turnover (Supplemen-
tary Information shows distributions generated
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Table 1: Power-law fits determined by [2] among socio-cultural data sets
Parameters include number of observations n, maximum observed value xmax,
observations in the tail ntail and the minimum value in the tail xmin
Quantity n xmax xmin α ntail f = ntail/n
intensity of wars 115 382 2.1± 3.5 1.7± 0.2 70± 14 0.609
religious followers (x 106) 103 1050 3.85± 1.60 1.8± 0.1 39± 26 0.379
word count 18855 14086 7± 2 1.95± 0.02 2958± 987 0.157
city population (x 103) 19447 8009 52.5± 11.9 2.37± 0.08 580± 177 0.030
terrorist attack severity 9101 2749 12± 4 2.4± 0.2 547± 1663 0.060
surname frequency (x 103) 2753 2502 112± 41 2.5± 0.2 239± 215 0.087
paper citations 415229 8904 160± 35 3.16± 0.06 3455± 1859 0.008
email address books 4581 333 57± 21 3.5± 0.6 196± 449 0.043
papers authored 401455 1416 133± 13 4.3± 0.1 988± 377 0.002
for increasing memory m with order of magni-
tude changes in the value of µ).
5 Discussion
The model we have presented can generate not
only a wide range of long-tailed distributions but
a constant turnover of the constituent agents
within any given overall rank-size distribution.
It is also able to replicate a newly-identified em-
pirical relationship whereby the power law expo-
nent increases as the proportion of data in the
tail falls.
The model is quite general, despite using only
two parameters. Varying the parameter values
can yield a range of distributions, such as a power
law over the whole sample, a power law only in
the tail, and a winner-take-all outcome. Since
the parameter m represents memory and µ rep-
resents innovation in modelled decision-making,
the real-world relationship between α and f in
Figure 3 may result from a variation in related
parameters among the different contexts of hu-
man decision-making. We conjecture that the
continuous relationship observed in Figure 3 sug-
gests that socio-economic power law distribu-
tions may form a continuum resulting from a
generalised process with limited memory. In con-
trast to the special m = all case (Figure 1), when
model runs with limited memory yield a power
law over the entire distribution (f = 1), it is only
with exponent α close to 1.5 (Figure 3).
This combination of results makes this model
unique among the many alternatives that can
produce power laws. The most commonly pro-
posed processes such as preferential attachment,
proportionate effect based on Gibrat’s princi-
ple, the ‘Matthew effect’ and the Yule process
[1, 2, 14, 25, 26], produce power laws from the
positive feedback introduced by interactions be-
tween individual agents. But these ‘rich get
richer’ models have not been able to account for
flux in the constituents of the ranked distribution
[27], either when growth is one of strict preferen-
tial attachment or even when growth is propor-
tionate to a stochastic rate independent of size
[28]. Even though “dynamical problems lie at
the forefront” of network science [16], in most
network models, existing connections affect fu-
ture connections such that change does not occur
naturally, but only with imposed modifications.
Social scientists have been critical of mod-
elling social and economic data by mapping onto
known phenomena in physics without consid-
ering realistic behavioural motivations of the
agents [12, 29, 30]. As a step in this direc-
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Figure 2: Log-log plots of rank and size. (a)
for typical model solutions with N = 1000, n =
100, t = 1000 and: µ = 0.01,m = 1 (black);
µ = 0.01,m = 100 (red); µ = 0.08,m = 100
(white); µ = 0.0001,m = 2 (green). (b)
for real-world top 100 ranked lists (dots) ver-
sus model results (lines). Top 100 lists include
[38]: male baby name frequency (per million) in
the 1990 US census (blue), RSS feed subscrip-
tions 2001-2008 (orange), English words (red),
cited economists 1993-2003 (purple), and reli-
gions in thousands of adherents (green). With
N = 1000, the model fits were made with µ =
0.001,m = 50, n = 200, t = 4000 for names,
µ = 0.00002,m = 6, n = 2500, t = 10000 for RSS
feeds, µ = 0.00025,m = 85, n = 100, t = 1100 for
cited economists, µ = 0.004,m = 4, n = 450, t =
8000 for words, and µ = 0.0007,m = 2, n =
100, t = 4000 for religions.
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Figure 3: The power law tail exponent α versus
the fraction f of total observations represented
by the tail. The dots show power law tails calcu-
lated for various real-world socio-cultural data
sets (see Table 1 for values and errors), whose
relationship (dashed grey curve) can be approx-
imated by α = 1.54f−0.156 (r2 = 0.952 except
for the outlier – the open circle – from email
lists). The thin red curve shows the least squares
fit from 300 runs of our theoretical model which
gives α = 1.56/f−0.155 (r2 = 0.975). Exponents
have been estimated using maximum likelihood
[1, 2].
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Figure 4: Life-spans of individual locations. (a)
Typical model runs, showing the cumulative dis-
tribution of number of time steps spent in the
top 5 for model runs of 1000 time steps with
N = 1000, n = 100, and m = 1. (b) Life-spans
of UK Number One Hits [39] for 1956-2007 (open
circles), versus the model, m = 1, µ = 0.1 (blue
line), and t years in the Top 5 US boys’ names
[40], 1907-2006 (filled circles) versus the model,
m = 10, µ = 0.001 (red line). Since the temporal
units are arbitrary, the modelled lifespans were
divided by 2 to match the albums, and divided
by 10 to match the names (which on the log-log
plot slides the distribution to the left).
tion, our model captures two fundamental mo-
tivations, the imitation of others and novelty in
invention.
Compared to similar, less flexible versions of
this model [15], a crucial new variable appears to
be the memory m, which reflects different time
frames to which agents will refer in different con-
texts. In terms of pure fashion markets such as
popular music for example [31], agents take into
account only the most recent decisions of others
and hardly ever those of several months or even
weeks ago. However in choosing where to locate
geographically, for example, a firm or a person in
a city will implicitly be using information from
many previous time steps with respect to the de-
cisions made by others.
Generating a range of long-tailed distribu-
tions with dynamic turnover, these features dis-
tinguish this model from the standard socio-
economic science model of individual rational be-
haviour where social influence is the exception
to the rule (as in, for example, ‘irrational’ stock
market bubbles or real estate crises). With its
unrealistic psychological assumptions [32] and
inconsistencies with experimental results [33],
the standard model suffers from a neglect of so-
cial influence, even in its modern form which
permits, for example, asymmetry in the amount
of information possessed by different agents [34,
35], the cost of gathering information [36], and
imperfections in gathering and processing infor-
mation [3].
Social influence is arguably ubiquitous among
the human species [37]. In fact, rather than the
agent’s cost-benefit analysis that has served as
a null hypothesis for rationality for over a cen-
tury, an alternative is that each agent uses (con-
sciously or not) the decisions of others as a basis
for his or her own decisions.
The social-influence model we have presented
allows choices among multiple possible alterna-
tives, which rise and fall in relative popularity
over time, rather than binary, ‘either-or’ deci-
sions. This is truly reflective of human interac-
tions such as the choice of a popular name for
a child, the citation of an academic paper, or
6
movement to a city where others have chosen
to live. Indeed, these phenomena are inherently
defined by the past decisions of others, without
which there would be no cities, familiar names,
or popular culture.
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